Multinational enterprises (MNEs) have long had a reputation of not doing enough for their host communities in developing countries. This study critically examines the role of MNEs in community development initiatives in developing countries, using the Nigeria oil industry and the South African mining industry as case study. Specifically, the study assessed the usefulness of MNE-supported community development projects as a means of demonstrating corporate social responsibility. The findings suggest that expectations for community development projects are greater in developing countries. This study introduced new information on MNEs' local development programs that were drawn from interviews with MNEs' managers, government officials, and local communities.
T here have been increasing demands on multinational enterprises (MNEs) to provide community development programs and assistance to the communities where they operate, in particular in developing countries (LDCs), in other words, meeting locally defined social and economic goals. This is mainly because developmental projects and other social infrastructures are lacking in most of these countries, and most of the time they are not provided by the state.
The purpose of this study is to examine the roles of MNEs as representatives of business in society and in creating and maintaining corporate social responsibility in LDCs. The study examines the involvement of MNEs in community development projects in LDCs. It assesses the value of MNEsupported community development projects as an expression of demonstrating corporate social responsibility and legitimacy to operate at different regions of the world. This is undertaken within the context of growing demands from various stakeholders for oil and mining industries to be more socially responsible. Yet despite the importance of the issue, limited discussion is evident in the literature on corporate social responsibility with particular reference to oil and mining exploitation in LDCs.
The empirical domain is the extractive industry (oil and mining companies) of Nigeria and South Africa. The case study is based in part on a series of interviews with key stakeholders in the Nigerian oil industry and South African mining industry. 1 The underlying approach adopted for this article has been to use all the information collected to provide a basis for MNEs and their host communities to resolve the social issues that have plagued relationships between them.
Study Background
Widespread community demands for relevant, direct, and sustained benefits from oil or gas and mineral wealth are a relatively recent phenomenon. So frequently neither government institutions nor companies or communities themselves have been properly equipped to respond to them (Culverwell, Lee, & Koziell, 2003) . In LDCs, MNEs are expected to provide some social services and welfare programs in addition to their normal economic activities. Considerable attention has been asked to be devoted to community development programs. For example, MNEs "provide education, scholarships, and build roads in Nigeria; build clinics and provide drugs for AIDS/ HIV patients in South Africa; and also provide medication and vaccination for malaria in Zambia." 2 In economic terms, these are not the functions of businesses, but in LDCs, these roles, or rather duties, are expected from MNEs. Indeed, there have been times when local people in mineral-and oilproducing regions have turned against MNEs precisely because they feel, as the president of Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People in the Niger Delta of Nigeria put it, "They were not getting enough social and economic infrastructures/assistance from the MNEs that operate in their communities."
A good example is the Ogoni case in Nigeria. Royal/Dutch Shell began operations in Ogoniland in 1958 in a joint venture with the Nigerian government. Shell is Nigeria's largest oil producer and generates more than "ten per cent of Shell's total exploration and production profits. $30 billion worth of oil has been taken from Ogoniland so far" (Banfield, 1998) . However, as will be discussed later, because of a worldwide campaign against multinational oil companies by the Ogoni people, in 1995 the World Council of Churches (1996) sent observers to the region who found "no piped water supplies, no good roads, no electricity, no telephones and no proper health care facilities" (p. 6).
Corporations are constantly under pressure to be more open and accountable for a wide range of actions and to report publicly on their performance in the social and environmental arenas. MNEs' alleged double standards, corporate scandals, and declines in economic and social development in host communities because of neglect and a lack of development initiatives from host governments have fanned the worldwide debate about the social responsibilities of corporations. Trends such as these raise serious questions about the behavior of MNEs and have "contributed to mounting pressures on business to demonstrate its social accountability, especially those multinationals which operate in politically and environmentally sensitive regions of the world, or which have supply chains that extend into those regions" (World Business Council for Sustainable Development, 1998, p. 8) . The continued interest of corporations in community and development initiatives has also contributed to the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (1998) definition of social/community involvement (issues) as: 3 A broad range of activities, including community assistance programs; supporting educational needs; fostering a shared vision of a corporation's role in the community; ensuring community health and safety; sponsorship; enabling employees to do voluntary work in the community; philanthropic giving. (p. 8) The World Bank also acknowledged the importance of corporate social involvement or investment issues when it stated in its 1995 annual report:
Evidence that human capital development is critical for overall economic and social development is not new. What is new is that the awareness of its importance has gone beyond the confines of academic scholars and social reformers and has entered into thinking of mainstream decision-makers. (Nelson, 1996, p. 41) The argument goes further that MNEs have a role in global development not only through capital investment but, more importantly, by investing in human capital and providing local people with the tools to drive their own economic development (Nelson, 1996) . Socially responsible practice in business has generated debates that are central to management practice and decision making. Some scholars have argued that managers should conduct business purely in the interests of the shareholders and that applying the orga-nization's resources to the social good undermines the market mechanism, jeopardizes organizational survival, and places management in the role of nonelected policy makers (Carson, 1993; Friedman, 1970) . This argument was further reiterated by Buchholz and Rosenthal (2004) . They argue that managers of corporations were said to have no legitimacy in making decisions about social responsibility as they would in effect be imposing taxes on the public by using money that appropriately belonged to shareholders, consumers, and employees for a public purpose.
Others, in contrast, argue that business has a responsibility, indeed an obligation, to help in solving problems of public concern (Monsen, 1974; Quinn & Jones, 1995) . Davis (1973) and Velasque (1996) support this view, suggesting that it is a matter of enlightened self-interest for organizations to be socially responsible because ethical behavior is more profitable and more rational than is unethical behavior and is crucial for organizational effectiveness.
Against this background, social responsibility has been argued to involve two major participants: business and society. According to Ojala (1994) , social responsibility has three major facets: complying with the law (legal), setting and abiding by moral and ethical standards, and giving philanthropically. Simply defined, social responsibility is the obligation of both business and society to take proper legal, moral-ethical, and philanthropic actions that will protect and improve the welfare of both society and business as a whole, all of which must be accomplished within the economic structures and capabilities of parties involved.
However, ambiguity remains because the social responsibility of business is whatever society decides that it is. In her work, Ojala (1994) asserts that in recent years, society has been exceptionally ambivalent . . . . Communities at different times and in different places establish different constraints within which business is expected to fulfill this purpose . . . . In the United States business activity has reflected a particular situation at a particular time, and as that situation changes so do the constraints on business. It is the change that raises the issues of social responsibility. (p. 86) Some studies have also empirically proven that "good corporate citizenship suggests MNEs have an obligation to act as responsible members of the societies which grant them legal standing" (Etheredge, 1999, p. 53) . According to Etheredge (1999) , its application to good corporate conduct generally implies responsibilities that go beyond meeting minimum legal requirements. Thus, social responsibility involves notions of voluntary corporate conduct that are both acceptable and beneficial to various social constituencies that surround business enterprises. By their nature, MNEs operate simultaneously in often dissimilar societies around the world where values, standards, and expectations of corporate conduct may differ quite radically. This great diversity in cultures, attitudes, and systems makes it more difficult than in a relatively homogeneous national business setting to determine common standards for desirable corporate conduct. From this perspective, Moon, Crane, and Matten (2005) have suggested that corporations can directly participate in societal governance, not only initially within their own boundaries but indirectly, reaching out to wider society in general.
In exceptional circumstances, MNEs may be called on to assume added responsibilities where other actors, including governments, do not or cannot carry out critical duties, as in Nigeria and South Africa. In this respect, the role of MNE social responsibility may be broadest in LDCs and transitional economies where free market regulating mechanisms are not yet fully formed or effective. In these circumstances, MNEs have a distinct challenge and a special opportunity in addressing social responsibility issues, especially where prospective host countries lack the legal framework, societal infrastructure, or established traditions and experience of a market economy.
The Objectives of the Article
This study examines the role of MNEs in corporate social responsibility in LDCs. The principal aim was to look at the issues relating to the community development initiatives of MNEs in the oil and mining industries of Nigeria and South Africa. The following questions will be addressed.
• What are the rationale for the provision of MNEs' community development projects in LDCs?
• What types of community development initiatives or projects are provided?
The community development initiatives discussed in this study include education initiatives such as provision of scholarships, technical training colleges, and teachers; social welfare initiatives such as housing, health services, potable water, and welfare; and infrastructure and small business development initiatives such as roads, market stalls, electricity, and small business training centers. The concluding section will draw together the argument and issues developed in the study.
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Theoretical Framework
Because of the empirical nature and the objectives of this study, three main theories will be applied in explaining the findings: social issue life cycle theory, legitimacy theory, and stakeholder theory. The three theories (which will be briefly explained below) were first applied together by Nasi, Nasi, Phillips, and Zyglidopoulos (1997) in a study of the social responsiveness of four large forestry companies. It is argued that although "the three perspectives are not precisely competing, each leads to a general prediction regarding the likelihood and evolution of a corporate response in the face of a social issue" (p. 299). They approach the corporation and its environment from different theoretical directions, and this is comparable to this study. According to Nasi et al., these theories of social issues management present distinct and incompatible accounts of a business person's ethical obligations, and hence, at most, one of them can be correct. 4 In this study, these general predictions are compared to the actual outcomes in the case studies.
Social Issue Life Cycle
Social life cycle theory maintains that social issues follow a predictable evolutionary trajectory (Mahon & Waddock, 1992) . The number of stages or periods through which an issue evolves varies from author to author. For instance, Ackerman (1975) identified three stages, whereas Mahon and Waddock (1992) identified four. Most social issue theorists agree that social issues progress from a period in which the issue was unthought of to a period of increasing awareness and expectations for action and then to a period when new standards for dealing with the issue become ingrained in the normal functioning of the company (Nasi et al., 1997) .
The most influential versions of the life cycle theory were developed by Ackerman (1975) in The Social Challenge to Business. In this book, he explored a number of instances of the evolution of the responses of business organizations to social issues. He found that, in general, the responsiveness of business organizations to social issues progresses through a three-phase trajectory: policy, learning, and commitment.
5 This conforms to the findings of this study. The MNEs interviewed have now improved their commitments to their host communities.
From the above description, four general trends can be identified, according to Nasi et al. (1997) : (a) increased organizational commitment to social action, (b) transition of organizational behavior from mere lip service to concrete action, (c) increased organizational familiarity with the social issue and with ways to deal with it, and (d) increased standardization of the responses to social and environmental issues at the operational level. These trends reflect the empirical findings of this study.
Proposition 1:
The social responsiveness of a corporation will proceed through a predictable series of phases, from issue identification through a learning phase and on to a commitment phase.
Theory of Legitimacy
Corporations, as one kind of social arrangement, require legitimacy to maintain functional, long-term relationships with various communities on which they depend. This theory originated with Davis's (1973) iron law of responsibility. It states that business is a social institution that must use its power responsibly. Otherwise, society may revoke it. Davis wrote, "Society grants legitimacy and power to business. In the long run, those who do not use power in a manner which society considers responsible will tend to lose it" (p. 314). Further, according to Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) , a corporation is said to be legitimate when it is judged to be "just and worthy of support" (p. 123). Corporations that lose legitimacy face a variety of difficulties, ranging from punitive legislation to difficulties in hiring qualified personnel. The benefits associated with legitimacy, combined with social pressures toward conformity, generally lead managers of illegitimate corporations to act to improve the legitimacy of their companies (Nasi et al., 1997) .
It is pertinent to stress at this point that society judges the legitimacy of a corporation based on the corporation's image. However, both the perceptions of a corporation and the expectations for the corporation can change over time (leading to changes in the legitimacy of the corporation) without there actually being any change in the actual activities of the corporation. The corporate image (how it is perceived) and societal expectations are the important factors that must be managed. Sethi (1979) posited that if corporations ignore social expectations, they are likely to lose control over their internal decision making and external dealings. This notion could be applied to the cases developed in this article. He posits that legitimacy problems occur when societal expectations for corporate behavior differ from societal perceptions of a corporation's behavior. Sethi suggests:
At any given time, there is likely to be a gap between performance and societal expectations caused by business actions or changing expectations. A continuously widening gap would cause business to lose legitimacy and threatening its survival. Business must therefore strive to narrow this "legitimacy gap" to maintain maximum discretionary control over its internal decision-making and external dealings. (p. 65)
Proposition 2:
The issues management activities of a corporation will be driven by the existence of legitimacy gaps. Management will adopt strategies, depending on which strategy has the highest perceived possibly of success and the lowest cost.
Stakeholder Theory
The stakeholder theory holds that effective management requires the balanced consideration of and attention to the legitimate interests of all stakeholders (Freeman, 1984) , defined as anyone who has "a stake in or claim on the firm" (Hasnas, 1998, p. 20) . This has been interpreted to include "any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the corporation" (Hasnas, 1998, p. 20) . It is perhaps more familiar in its narrow sense in which the stakeholder groups are limited to shareholders, customers, employees, suppliers, management, and the local community. Thus, stakeholder theory asserts that a business' financial success can best be achieved by giving the interests of the business' shareholders, customers, employees, suppliers, management, and local community proper consideration and adopting policies that produce the optimal balance among them (Hasnas, 1998) . Similarly, Welcomer, Cochran, Rands, and Haggerty (2003) posit that firms and stakeholders actively working together in hopes of mutual gain can have a significant impact on the firm. This viewpoint seeks to explain current corporate behavior rather than to argue for a more moral position.
According to Mitchell, Agle, and Wood (1997) , "Managers who want to achieve certain ends pay particular kinds of attention to various classes of stakeholder . . . managers' perceptions dictate stakeholder salience . . . and various classes of stakeholders might be identified based upon the possession of power, legitimacy, and urgency" (p. 872). Wicks, Berma, and Jones (1999) examine the issue of trust between a firm and its stakeholders. They suggest that managers can, through their behavior, help determine levels of trust in relationships between the firm and its various stakeholders. That is, trust between a firm and its stakeholders is an integral part of the strategy formulation process that will help smooth the relationship in the future.
From this inclusive perspective, the corporation exists at the intersection of a range of interests; it is a node in a complex web of social relationships of dependency and expectation (Wood, 1994) . From a managerial point of view, corporate success depends on an on going process of stakeholder management in which the interests and demands of stakeholders are identified and dealt with appropriately (Freeman, 1984) . It is therefore argued here that organization reaction to stakeholder interests can improve organizational performance (Berman, Wicks, Kotha, & Jones, 1999) . Working with stakeholders can lead to the articulation of a shared vision to resolve problems and to innovate solutions to formerly gridlocked issues (Welcomer et al., 2003) . Similarly, Jones and Wicks (1999) have argued that firms that look after the interests of key stakeholders and behave in a morally defensive fashion will, all else being equal, achieve greater success in the marketplace than will those that do not. In this context, it is not social issues to which corporations respond but rather stakeholder issues (Clarkson, 1995) . According to Carroll (1996) , the important task for managers is to identify stakeholder groups (groups that share an interest) and determine the amount of power they, as a group, have.
Proposition 3: Managers will respond to the demands of the most powerful stakeholders. As stakeholder groups gain and lose power, managerial activities will change focus.
The three perspectives are applied to the cases developed in this article. The results of the analysis of these three different perspectives are presented in the discussion and implication section of this article. This allows conclusions to be drawn about the adequacy of each view and the way the three theories interact.
The three theories are applied in this article for three reasons. First, this article is empirical and provides a complex, real-world test, and the theories are helpful in understanding how and when corporations deal with social issues discussed in this article. Second, although the study only examines social issues concerning international oil and mining practices, the theories, based on the cases in this article, allow us to understand how MNEs respond to social issues in LDCs. Finally, each theory makes different assumptions about the nature of the corporation and the relations among corporations and their environments.
Educational Initiatives
Multinational corporations have been encouraged by many scholars to develop clear and specific objectives, duties, and obligations in the international markets in which they operate (Moon et al., 2005; Ojala, 1994; Velasque, 1996; Welcomer et al., 2003) . According to Manakkalathil (1995) , these objectives, duties, and obligations should take into consideration the vested interests of both the host country and the host population.
During empirical research in Africa, educational initiatives were frequently mentioned by interviewees as one of the most important development initiatives at the local level. For example, a senior mining executive in South Africa defined corporate social responsibility or investment. He stated: "Our willingness to plow back into communities so that we can reap that seed in the future by getting good employees" (S. Seepei, personal communication, August 17, 1999). And when asked to mention the areas that were most critical to his company, he stated: "Education, skills training, youth training, building roads for the rural inhabitants and health care." This view is supported by a manager of Anglo-American, who defined corporate social responsibility or investment in her company as:
A spirit of good neighbourliness or doing good by doing, where minds are actively engaged in partnerships in the communities and these can be of a developmental nature, they can be of a nature that seeks to create alternative economic livelihoods for people given the fact that mining is eventually limiting (M. Keeton, personal communication, August 25, 1999). According to this source, the company provided educational investment or projects because of "high levels of very poor education attainment, high levels of illiteracy, limited economic opportunities for people, limited health and social networks and care" because of the country's past apartheid policies (M. Keeton, personal communication, August 25, 1999) . She further mentioned that the company's social fund, called the Chairman's Fund (first introduced by a multinational company in South Africa in 1974), had been used to identify promising youngsters in their final years at school and give them bursaries to go and study mining engineering and geology at South African universities.
It should be noted that the method employed by MNEs to carry out social investment or responsibility in developed countries is different from the approach used in the LDCs. The philosophy behind it is the same, but the expectations in LDCs are greater. In the United Kingdom, for example, companies do donate to good causes through charitable organizations or the sponsorship of sports activities, and this social gesture often goes unnoticed. In the LDCs, on the other hand, when multinational companies invest in community projects, the activity is inherently high profile. In a nutshell, what looks like a charitable donation is part and parcel of the daily expectations of multinationals in the LDCs.
The above analysis conforms with the notion that corporations should go beyond their narrow economic and legal responsibilities to shareholders and contribute to worthy causes that are part of broader social concerns. This notion is supported by the World Bank, as asserted during interviews with senior executives of the multinational oil and mining companies. The World Bank requires such companies when starting new projects to provide details of community programs before work commences.
Rationale for Education Initiatives
Educational initiatives are not a new phenomenon. In his work on Rio Tinto mining company in Spain, Harvey (1981, p. 124) shows that as early as 1885, the company educated more than 1,200 children free of charge in seven schools with a staff of 25 qualified teachers; and subsequently, educational facilities were expanded to meet the need of a growing population. In addition, the most promising elementary school pupils were recruited for technical, clerical, and junior managerial positions. Harvey's study shows the education system to reflect credibly on the British firm. Literacy levels at Rio Tinto were consistently far higher than the national average, and by 1890, most skilled mining and engineering jobs at the mines had been filled by Spaniards.
Education Initiatives in Nigeria and South Africa
In Nigeria, oil company operations have been dogged by "local unrest and criticism from the communities within the oil-producing areas, and drawn increasing condemnation from abroad" (Greenpeace International, 1994, p. 9) . Charges of unethical behavior include: "Total neglect of the Niger Delta (oil producing areas in Nigeria) and lack of educational facilities such as classrooms, teachers, and scholarships which will enhance the literacy development of the indigenes of the communities" (M. Mitee, personal communication, April 15, 1999) . During the years, the oil exploration and producing companies have borne the brunt of "endless communal agitation, as the host communities have looked up to them for support and assistance in the provision of social and economic infrastructure and employment" (Nigerian Petroleum News, 1998, p. 1). The people of the Niger Delta "who now live in a polluted environment, have received precious little in return for living with the oil companies and dispute both the quantity and quality of community assistance" (M. Mitee, personal communication, April 15, 1999) . Mitee also pointed out that "people have grown to realize that the oil companies are taking from their communities and are not putting anything back. The poorest parts of Nigeria are where these oil companies are, and this has heightened conflict."
The case study of Shell and the Ogoni by Hummels (1998) reveals that host communities have continued to agitate for more and more support from the oil companies. In addition, the level of the demands and the methods adopted to achieve these have changed, with violence appearing to be the key weapon. Recourse to violence has resulted in a lot of damage to property and casualties on both sides. In some instances, it has resulted in the withdrawal of operations by oil companies from some locations, whereas planned seismic and drilling activities have been abandoned in others.
In the past, the oil companies' approach was to help or appease the communities whenever the need arose. More recently, however, they have established a more proactive and thoughtful approach to community assistance. This has resulted in the "emergence of a fully developed community relations department in each of the companies, solely set up to anticipate and plan the needs of the communities" (Nigerian Petroleum News, 1998, p. 1), who understand better their own real needs and future aspirations. During interviews with senior managers of oil companies in Nigeria, it was confirmed that community relations departments were created solely to meet local needs and situational politics (P. Omuku, personal communication, April, 7, 1999) . The argument here supports the theoretical position of Nasi et al. (1997) who argue that corporations tend to listen to the demand of powerful stakeholder groups. This argument could also be linked to the work of Wicks and Berman (2004) on trust in firm-stakeholder relationships. They argue that the environment within which firms operate may affect the ability of firms to create a particular level of trust with key stakeholder groups. In this case, the multinational oil companies listened carefully to the demands of host communities and changed their approach toward them.
The accusation of unethical behavior on the part of mining companies with respect to education is of great concern in the new South Africa. Many Black people working in the mines wish to progress their career but cannot. This is mainly because they do not have the opportunity to further their education, through no fault of their own or unwillingness but because of the previous apartheid policy of educating only one race (the Whites) in the country.
Businesses have come to learn and understand that they have an obligation to stakeholders other than shareholders. This has been manifested in their mission statements that have come in different forms especially since the 1990s. Lee and Mckenzie (1994) maintain that the idea of social responsibility supposes that the corporation has not only economic and legal obligations but also certain responsibilities to society that extend beyond these obligations. They further suggest that executives also have responsibilities toward other identified groups-workers, consumers, and community residents-with whom the executives have implicit and explicit compacts.
Moreover, a firm's social responsibility mandate means that resources may be used to tackle various issues including "pollution problems . . . poverty and racial discrimination problems . . . consumerism . . . and other social problems areas" (p. 970).
The issue of community development, for example, has compelled Shell in Nigeria to speak about its community initiatives, when once it believed that "silence is golden" (Akpan, 1999) . A Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC) executive stated that not many Nigerians were aware that "since the mid-1950's, SPDC has assisted more than 1,500 host communities in its areas of operation through an ever-widening range of services covering education, agriculture, health, and water supply" (N. Pepple, personal communication, March 25, 1999) . In the research interviews carried out among the managers of multinational oil and mining companies in Africa, all the companies reported similar community initiatives for the areas where they operate. A senior mining executive pointed out:
In our corporate social responsibility areas, we have got a wide range of things. Education is very important and we have programs that go from preschool education right the way through to secondary school, to completing secondary school. We have got a number of interventions in education, technical training, technical skills training. Job creation is also very important on our part; it is part of business development (S. H. Rix, personal communication, August 24, 1999).
Educational initiatives include the provision of teachers paid directly by the companies and the building of classrooms. There are also situations where companies pay special rates to teachers to encourage them to go and teach in rural areas where the governments are inactive. This is because teachers refuse to teach in some rural areas because of the remote nature of such villages as stated by both Shell in Nigeria and Anglo-American in South Africa.
To show their commitment to the communities where they operate, policies for educational developments are incorporated into the companies' credos. For example, Shell Oil Company wrote in Article 7 of their Statement of General Business Principles:
The most important contribution that companies can make to the social and material progress of the countries in which we operate is in performing their basic activities as effectively as possible. In addition Shell companies take constructive interest in societal matters which may not be directly related to the business . . . . The Foundation's Mission is to promote and support the holistic development of disadvantaged people and communities. We also believe in initially retaining operational involvement in the projects we undertake . . . . Our main fields of services are-education, technical training. (Palabora Foundation, 1997) In the Anglo-American chairman's 1997 annual report statement, he said this on education:
Whilst the private sector through bodies such as the National Business Initiative (NBI) is helping enhance capacity, for example in its local governance programme, much more could and should be done, particularly if the local private sector and foreign donors were to collaborate more in this area. The same is true in educational interventions where the considerate contribution made by the private sector through the joint Educational trust (JET), the NBI and NGOs like READ, could also be increased. (Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa Limited, 1997) Even though most social programs are supposed to have been provided by governments, there are calls to oil and mining companies to intervene in their place (M. Mitee, personal communication, April 15, 1999) . And as such, if the companies make contributions to educational developments in such countries, it will make a big difference to host communities in the long term, as noted in Harvey's (1981) study in Spain. This, it is argued, will enhance the educational development of the indigenes of oil and mining communities (S. H. Rix, personal communication, August 24, 1999) . This viewpoint supports the earlier suggestion that MNEs may be called on to assume added responsibilities where other actors, including governments, do not or cannot carry out critical duties.
MNEs' Educational Investment in Africa
In a quest to be ethically correct, oil and mining companies, as discovered during the study trip to Africa, are major contributors to social investment and education initiatives as a critical part of their investment. This evidence supports the argument of Amaewhule (1997) , who suggests that multinational oil and mining companies, because of the nature of their operations, should be more vigilant in showing social responsibility. It can be shown from findings in Africa that companies now identify themselves as partners in providing welfare services rather than as donors of services. An AngloAmerican senior executive simply put it:
The political realities and economic exigencies of the late 1980s and early 1990s spurred a shared commitment to development and a range of new initiatives and partnerships between the mines and their neighbours. This interaction takes various forms and much depends on the individual circumstances of mines and communities or the role of particular "champion" who take the lead to establish developmentally-informed relationships with local communities and institutions. (Keeton, 1997) 
Case Study From Nigeria
As the nature of educational initiatives are the same in all the countries studied, Shell Oil Company education initiatives will be used to explain how projects are carried out.
6 Table 1 shows the company's community assistance toward education between 1994 and 1998. Aside from the these projects that the company provides every year for the producing districts, the company also provides another 60 university scholarships to students from all over the country (2 from each state of the federation), based on competitive examinations. The company states that it actually provides 480 university scholarships for students from oil producing areas every year and sponsors professorship at five Nigerian Universities in subjects related to the oil industry-mechanical engineering (Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria), geology (University of Nigeria, Nsukka), environmental studies (Rivers State University of Science Technology, Port Harcourt), geophysics (Obafemi Awolowo University, Ife), and petroleum engineering (University of Ibadan, Ibadan). It should be noted that other oil companies in Nigeria have their own separate educational projects for the producing communities where they operate.
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A situation wherein the actions of a multinational enterprise are commonly perceived to have had a detrimental impact on the host community, arousing powerful emotions which express themselves variously through such things as strikes, demonstrations, press campaigns, legal actions, financial sanctions and sabotage.
The cases involved big multinational companies that their host communities believe have acted in an unacceptable ethical manner, and the issues have attracted intense public attention.
It is worth bearing in mind that not all community initiatives are welcomed by the host communities. The Ogoni and the Ijaw oil producing communities in Nigeria have been using violence, the seizure of premises and rigs, and kidnapping to voice their discontent with the oil companies even though the oil companies have argued that they have spent millions of dollars on community development in Nigeria. The communities, in turn, have argued that they were not contacted on many projects before the companies embarked on them (Akpan, 1999) . The oil companies on the other hand have recognized their plight and the reasons for their discontent. As Noble Pepple, a Shell senior executive, stated:
We have had difficulties to deal with the community grievances and community problems. The community problems have stemmed from two main issues; communities within the Niger Delta area have felt that not enough of the money which comes from the area in terms of oil revenues have been ploughed back into developing the area, and much of the area is underdeveloped. (N. Pepple, personal communication, March 25, 1999) The company also agreed that in the past the communities were not consulted before they embarked on projects, and they had now realized that consultation with the host communities on their needs is a means of reducing tension in the area. However, Pepple points out that:
The role of government remains the provision of infrastructure and services. When that role is not played in a country like Nigeria, companies like Shell find themselves more and more at the civilian end of the community anger and therefore has to play that role which government is supposed to play but it is not playing, and that is why my company makes a huge contribution within the oil producing communities.
Social Welfare
Research has suggested that adopting sound corporate social responsibility policies may be not only socially desirable but also good for business. The public and various stakeholders have come to expect more from a business (Frooman, 1997) . According to Frooman (1997) , stakeholders increasingly are looking to the private sector for help with a myriad of complex and pressing social and economic issues. Social welfare in this context refers to rural and social projects provided by MNEs, that is, the provision of projects such as health services, housing, potable water schemes, and agricultural assistance to the farmers. Looking at these projects, they are often part of the social infrastructure that should have been provided by governments. One of the reasons for the MNEs'action is that some governments in LDCs ignore or neglect structural developments because of a lack of proper development plans or corruption on the part of officials. As is the case in many LDCs, the areas that are underdeveloped are where most LDCs have large volumes of mineral and oil deposits and also where the MNEs mostly operate.
In LDCs, one of the major problems facing MNEs is to identify the social demands of producing communities and to prioritize these. When some of the demands of the host communities are not provided, it can lead to the destruction of company properties and installations, as has repeatedly happened in the Niger Delta of Nigeria (T. Humbulani, personal communication, August 31, 1999). The notion that some MNE services are taken for granted supports the work of Barry (1991) , who argues that some suggest that good business ethics requires corporations to subordinate the desire for profit to other considerations.
It has been shown that despite the provision of certain services by MNEs, some host communities are still not satisfied with the scale of development initiatives. The main reason is that they were not consulted before the pro-jects were introduced. During the author's study trip to Africa, the interviewed company managers confirmed that they have since changed the way projects are introduced or sponsored. They now consult the host communities or ask the host communities what they need from the company before any project is introduced. This phenomenon could be argued as another issue of trust between the firm and its stakeholders, discussed by Wicks et al. (1999) and Wicks and Berman (2004) . As pointed out by a senior mining manager: "All these programs have been jointly agreed on with the community. We do not lay down programs from here. Those programs are produced as the consequence of consultation; it is what they want" (S. Stewart, personal communication, March 30, 1999) . It is noteworthy to mention that during fieldwork in Nigeria, it was found that some oil communities are satisfied with the community projects provided by oil companies, even though the majority of the communities are dissatisfied.
Social Welfare Discourse
This section examines the reasons that prompted the host communities to demand social welfare projects from the multinational companies. In many LDCs, national and local governments have taken a more hands-off approach to regulating business because of such things as changing policies, the globalization of commerce, and shrinking resources. Against this background, companies are relying less on government for guidance, and instead they are pursuing their own policies with regard to such matters as environmental performance, working conditions, and ethical marketing practices. This approach can be problematic. The secretary of the chief's council of the oilproducing village of Bonny in the Niger Delta of Nigeria accused the oil companies of apartheid in its residential areas where all the state of the art welfare facilities including good water, constant electricity, good roads, super markets, schools with high-tech equipment, swimming pools, and other facilities were in existence, while the people of Bonny, the host community, suffer absolute squalor and neglect. ("Oil Sector Dislocations," 1999, p. 34) This is one example of a charge of double standard brought against multinationals in LDCs. The host communities believe they should have the same facilities that are on offer to the companies'workers because the bulk of profits of the MNEs come from their land. As one observer pointed out:
Communities in the delta area in particular, where most of the exploration and production activities take place, feel generally ill-treated in the entire process of oil prospecting and production and consider themselves as being at the end of only the adverse effects of these activities. They believe that they have not received an equitable share of the tremendous oil revenues which are being derived from their land and territories, especially in the light of disruptive consequences on their health and sources of livelihood. Nor have they been recognized as the inhabitants of oil producing areas who should benefit from the natural resource that abounds in their ancestral lands. (Nnadozie, 1998, p. 8) According to Nnadozie (1998), because of inadequate social amenities and infrastructure and the loss of farmland, bearing in mind that farming is their way of life, the Bonny community's demands from the oil companies include "payment of N500 million (naira) to fishermen and farmers for the disruption of their livelihood; and provision of potable water and electricity to every home on the island" (p. 8). The demands of host communities are numerous, and MNEs are desperately trying to provide them whenever possible. This is because some host communities, particularly in Nigeria, have barred the MNEs from operating in their communities until their demands are met. There have been circumstances whereby the MNEs kept operating in some host communities and the youths of the community went and kidnapped the companies' workers, leading in some cases to the loss of lives.
It is frequently the case that oil and mining companies are blamed for inactivity by government. A BP engineer who visited an oil town in Nigeria in 1990 remarked: "I have explored for oil in Venezuela, I have explored for oil in Kuwait, I have never seen an oil-rich town as completely impoverished as Oloibiri" (Greenpeace International, 1994, p. 14) . The Nigerian government is supposed to direct 3% of its oil revenue to develop communities where the oil is produced. However, as a community leader states:
Little, if any, of that money has reached those in need of it. Even Shell has admitted as much but maintains that it is beyond the scope of its business activities. The Ogoni see it differently. They see Shell as a multinational, supported by the federal government of Nigeria, which was influential enough to persuade the government to increase the oil revenue royalty from 1.5% to 3% in 1982, but unwilling to ensure that the money is made of effective use. (M. Mitee, personal communication, April 15, 1999) In South Africa, the allegations against the multinational mining companies are similar. For example, the South African multinational mining companies have been accused of:
Neglecting their mining producing communities during the apartheid regime. The mining communities lacked electricity, housing, potable water, and their farmland were destroyed by the mining activities. Even though they claimed to have done many things to correct the wrongdoing of the past, they have not done anything to improve the lives of people living in the mining areas. It is the government that have embarked on notable housing and electrification projects. What are the companies that neglected the communities doing? They are only after their profits. (T. Humbulani, personal communication, August 31, 1999) The tensions that exist between companies and communities have resonances in the developed world, but with lesser intensity. For example, in the northern English town of Sheffield, the mining community accused the mining companies of neglecting the city after mining operations ceased. Mining was a primary source of income in Sheffield and other cities in the United Kingdom, but after the closure of the mines, the cities became deprived and were badly affected during the recession of the 1990s. The government has put a big effort into reviving the fortunes of mining areas through retraining and cash incentives for employers to set up there. In LDCs the situation is different, as the host communities expect more from the MNEs than from their governments, which are supposed to be the sole providers of the welfare projects. The reason for this is because of the high level of corruption amongst the government officials in the LDCs. The MNEs are considered to be influential to the government economic policies in the LDCs.
MNEs and Social Welfare Initiatives
During the study trip to Africa, MNEs were asked to give the reasons why they make social welfare investments. The answers given were generally similar. According to a senior mining executive:
There are several reasons. The real reason why we have it is because most of the people who work in our operations, they live in those communities, they work in those communities and they want those communities to prosper. So, one of the major drivers for these community programs comes from our employees. The second reason very often is depending on the social context: there are requirements in some countries where we are based where the state is not very strong, the public finances are not strong; there is need for health, education, things like that, so we try to do what we can within the governments overall policies. (S. Stewart, personal communication, March 30, 1999) The above suggests that companies take responsibility for governmental functions as a matter of necessity rather than choice. The host communities argue that the wealth being generated should also be used for community development. Wealth creation is central to the economic role of business, but society determines the extent to which this wealth can be enjoyed and the value systems that surround enterprises. This view is summarized by the comments of two of the most successful entrepreneurs of their day:
There is but one right mode of using enormous fortunes-namely, that the possessors from time to time during their own lives should so administer these as to promote the permanent good of the communities from which they were gathered . . . . Business only contributes fully to a society if it is efficient, profitable and socially responsible (Cannon, 1992, p. 33). This is a reminiscent of a senior mining executive in South Africa:
It is impossible for any company to isolate itself from the community of which it is part. It is even more impossible to do that in a mining company because mines are put where God put the ore, not where people would like it to be. So we have got no mines near any big cities; all of our mines are in rural areas, and those communities have the capacity to shut our mines, and in many cases they own the mineral rights they are re-lease or buy or have some contractual arrangement with them regarding the mineral rights, because it is often on tribal territory. So the community is not only important to us; it is essential to us and having a good healthy community is a crucially important part of good business, and it's impossible to operate an effective business in an unstable environment. (A. J. Frost, personal communication, August 20, 1999) A manager of a multinational oil company interviewed further suggested that MNEs in LDCs find themselves in paradoxical situations because:
for quite a long time people in LDCs have seen MNEs to be very large, very powerful, and very important because of their economic contribution to countries. That they are too bad and too big and unaccountable and people tend to lump all companies together in that sort of umbrella. Now at the same time though, very often in developing countries, governments are either incapable because they are too poor or unwillingly, because they are too corrupt, to solve a lot of problems which are inherent within the social fabric of that country and then these same people who accuse companies of having all this power then almost torturously turn round and say the only people who can actually fix this are those very same companies that we so dislike (M. Wade, personal communication, March 8, 1999).
The Situation in Nigeria
The Nigeria Shell Oil Company believes its role as a responsible Nigerian company is to work with the communities in its areas of operation, to com-plement and add value to the central core of government-driven development (Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited, 1995) . 7 In fulfilling this role, the company assists the government in building houses in the oil producing communities. The company also provides and maintains basic amenities for communities such as potable water schemes. This is done either by themselves or with some nongovernmental organizations. The company claims to have constructed "thirty community water projects and provided block wall fencing for ten existing schemes in 1998, and two of the projects involved expensive deep water wells, which were drilled with standard oil rigs at a cost of $190,000 each." 8 On the issue of health care services, the company has committed itself to setting up a network of rural heath centers, each with beds and facilities to perform simple operations. The aim, according to the company, is to make sure every oil-producing community is within reach of medical help. All the health centers are fully equipped, including water and electricity supplies and quarters for doctors and nurses. Similar aid is planned for government hospitals and clinics. Other medical aid includes the donation of: Dialysis equipment worth $1.4 million to the University of Port Harcourt Teaching Hospital, whereas medical equipment has been donated to 17 community clinics since 1985. The total Shell investment in the rural health centers so far tops $6 million as of 1995. (Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited, 1995, p. 20) Agricultural support is Shell's oldest community initiative. This began in 1960 when a study in Ogoni land provided the blueprint for a successful agricultural program that has since helped an estimated 90% of farmers in the oilproducing delta area and others far beyond. At the heart of the program is a network of 24 agricultural officers scattered throughout the Shell oilproducing areas. They advise farmers on crop selection, planting densities, crop rotation, harvesting methods, fertilizers, crop protection, and sales outlets and distribute new high-yield, disease-resistant crop varieties developed in Shell's own research and seed multiplication farms (Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited, 1995) . The company estimates that in 1993 and 1994, the officers reached 154,000 new farmers. Since records were first kept in the early 1980s, more than 400,000 farmers have been directly helped. Fish farming was boosted in 1998 through the mass distribution of fish fingerlings and restocking of the Nembe Fish Farm. The company also supplied planting materials to farmers between 1991 and 1998 (see Table 2 ). Nigeria's Chevron Oil Company's health policy is typified by its campaigns against AIDS, river blindness, and intestinal worms. The company argued that AIDS was a terrible disease that affected a large number of people all over the world. On the issue of AIDS, Chevron asserted that "most of the things we are getting involved with especially in the health area are to make a positive impact on the quality of people's lives" ("Corporate Responsibility," 1996, p. 17). On river blindness, the company further stated: "Our selected areas are the Imo and Delta states. Our programs of massdeworming is in progress. It would cover some 13,000 children in Warri North Local Government Area" ("Corporate Responsibility," 1996, p. 17) . The other multinational oil companies in Nigeria have similar social welfare schemes in place.
The Situation in South Africa
In South Africa, the Anglo-American Corporation's support for primary health care work in disadvantaged and underserviced communities is an important area for the Chairman's Fund. 9 The care provided by St. John Ambulance to the sick and destitute in the informal settlements of Gauteng is matched by the others backed by the fund in outreach and training activities in the heavily populated, rural areas of the eastern cape, KwaZulu Natal, and the Northern Province. Since 1978, the fund has supported a team of Gauteng doctors for St. Joseph's Clinic in the Levubu district. There are also maternity and HIV clinics in rural areas.
De Beers of South Africa strives to be a good corporate citizen in all countries in which it operates. During the years, the company's social investment in South Africa of nearly US$45 million has been matched by a similar amount donated to charitable and social investment projects around the world. 10 The De Beers Chairman's Fund has donated funds and helped smallscale farming in Namaqualand and the Red Cross Flying Doctor Service in the Northern Cape. In other Africa countries such as Zambia, Bwana Mkubwa Mining Limited "provides help for the police by renovating their stations in Ndola, and buying them motor vehicles" (S. Whittome, personal communication, August 3, 1999). The company is also involved in a malaria elimination campaign in the mining community where it operates. In addition, Bwana Mkubwa provides pure drinking water and sewage disposal and helps hospitals by providing drugs.
It has been shown that numerous social welfare schemes are being provided by the multinational oil and mining companies in LDCs. However, this has not stopped host communities from accusing them of unethical behavior. On the basis of the fieldwork evidence, it can be concluded that although the contribution of MNEs to economic development is not questioned, leaders of host communities in each of the countries visited argue that the value of MNE social investments is contestable. The charge remains that the companies are only interested in caring for the profits to be made, depleting rather than building community resources. According to Mitee, corporate social welfare provision is "not based on the priorities of the community but what tends to suit the public relation of the company" (M. Mitee, personal communication, April 15, 1999).
Infrastructure and Small Business Development
Infrastructure and small business development schemes are part and parcel of MNE community development programs in LDCs. Schemes include the building of roads and market stalls and the provision of electricity and small business training programs.
Comparative Case in the United States
There are parallels in developed countries such as the United States where, for example, Wal-Mart Stores Inc. believes that "each of its discount stores, Sam's Clubs, super centers and distribution centers should contribute to the well being of the local community" (Chain Store Age, 1999, p. 69). It has more than 3,000 locations and distributed nearly $128 million in 1998 to local organizations. Through the Wal-Mart Foundation, the umbrella for the company's community initiatives, the company divides its community service work into the areas of "education, environment, children, the economy, and neighbours" (Chain Store Age, 1999, p. 70) . Some of the programs affect organizations on a national scale, but the majority of the company's initiatives are highly localized. Community support also extends into the local business community and government. The annual American Hometown Leadership Award by the company recognizes outstanding government officials who "serve communities of 25,000 people or less. Wal-Mart also allocates more than $2 million each year to support industrial park expansion and development, incubator programs and low-interest loans for new small businesses" (Chain Store Age, 1999, p. 71).
The Case in Africa
In LDCs, however, community development initiatives go much further. Corporate roles are differently structured. They have to get the communities behind them because of the hostility sometimes expressed by host communities. A senior mining executive suggested:
The practice of consulting the community about the environmental impacts of projects is not just a simplistic "jobs versus the environment" debate. It is an opportunity for the mining company to set out its development vision for and commitment to the area where its operations are based and to begin a larger process of interaction to address the concerns and needs of those whose lives will be influenced. (Keeton, 1997) In South Africa, for example, mining communities in remote areas are generally dependent on a single, nonrenewable resource, the price of which is subject to world market fluctuations. This has led managers, employees, trade unions, and community leaders to recognize their common plight. Some remarkable partnerships have been formed as managers have sought to broaden and deepen local capacities and to foster economic opportunities beyond mining. Hence, initiatives such as business training schemes to equip host communities with the skills needed to market products successfully in competitive markets have spread.
Rationale for Infrastructure and Business Training Schemes
The alleged unethical behavior that has prompted host communities to demand from MNEs infrastructure improvements and small business training schemes is similar to that discussed earlier. On the issue of electrification of the communities, the companies are accused of neglecting the areas where they work by only "providing electricity to their installations. The communities do not benefit from the same developments that the companies undertake for their installations and workers" (M. Mitee, personal communication, April 15, 1999) . This accusation could equally be directed at government departments responsible for rural development.
11 Because of the complexity of working in LDCs and the spotlight that comes with it, the MNEs, under intense public scrutiny, are now expected, even required, to carry out the duty of developing the rural areas where they work.
Companies are often accused of "damaging roads because of the impact of their operations and their locations sometimes denied the producing areas from setting up market stalls where their farm produce would be bought" (C. Muchimba, personal communication, August 2, 1999) . These practices, the host communities argue, deny them access to good roads and marketplaces to sell their crops. Hence, the MNEs have to provide the necessary infrastructure and services. An oil company executive argued that companies are "providing these services because they want their host communities to benefit from the success of their operations from their communities and lands" (P. Omuku, personal communication, April, 7, 1999) . This view was generally shared by all the senior managers interviewed.
The host communities, on the other hand, still argue that the companies do not do what they say they do. For example, a community leader asserted that "most of these developments are only reflected on their books, not on the ground, and even then it is not based on the priorities set by the communities but what suits their public relation image of the company" (M. Mitee, personal communication, April 15, 1999) . He cited a situation when he was a chairman of a development committee in 1994 and Shell offered to buy them some hospital equipment. The committee gave Shell a list of what it wanted because at the time they thought the "list was a significant thing to our community centre which we built" (M. Mitee, personal communication, April 15, 1999) . They were disappointed when the company sent them different items from those on the list. The items were rejected and returned to the company. He went on to add that "to them what we requested is not important. What is important is what suits their image, and that is what they want to do" (M. Mitee, personal communication, April 15, 1999) .
Such reports call into question the level of MNE commitment to corporate social responsibility. Some scholars such as Hummels have argued that MNE social investments amount to little more than good public relations. On the other hand, the companies assert that "corporate social investments are not a public relation thing but serious and solid investments in the host communities and for the host communities" (M. Keeton, personal communication, August 25, 1999) .
Business Training Scheme
The nonrenewable nature of oil and mining operations and high degree of dependency of the host communities on such operations has brought to the fore the issue of small business training schemes. Whenever employees are made redundant, companies are accused of not preparing workers for skills in other industries. This led to the introduction of small business training schemes in the host communities and has become an intense ethical issue when dealing with the producing communities. This study confirms that oil companies in Nigeria such as Shell have numerous small business training initiatives; however, like other projects, the communities still feel the projects are to improve the corporate image abroad. For example, Shell has the Women's Programme in the Niger Delta.
12 The program provides training for women of all ages (particularly teenage mothers and adolescents who left school early), focusing on soap and pomade making, sewing, hairdressing, and catering. Other small business initiatives by the company include microcredit and business development. Because of a lack of access to finance, which is a key inhibitor to business development and self-employment in the rural parts of Nigeria, including most of the host communities, micro-credit and business development programs have been established within the development portfolio. The aim is to help revive the economy of the host areas by promoting self-help enterprise development. As Omuku and Pepple aptly put it, a key objective is "to build up local capacity to operate and manage micro-credit schemes."
In South Africa, the Palabora Mining Company's foundation has a business development scheme for its host communities, "especially amongst the previously disadvantaged communities" (S. H. Rix, personal communication, August 24, 1999) . 13 The scheme has received a new impetus through engaging a nongovernmental organization to nurture small businesses to become suppliers of goods and services to mainstream firms in the area. The company also supports the Reef Training Centre. The center was established to "provide a technical training centre to serve the needs of the informal industrial and commercial centre . . . . To enter into partnership arrangements with other like-minded organizations for the provision of training" (S. H. Rix, personal communication, August 24, 1999) . Training courses are competency based and are aimed at supplying trained workers for the construction and motor repair industries, and "all courses are accredited by the relevant industry training boards" (S. H. Rix, personal communication, August 24, 1999) . More than 800 trainees graduate annually, and in 1996 1,000 students completed training at the center. The training center also embarked on liaising with communities in Gauteng and other parts of the country to provide the graduates with job opportunities once they complete their courses.
The Palabora Foundation is focused on small business development. With foundation assistance, women in the Phalaborwa area have undergone training in craft manufacture and have established a number of small cooperatives, manufacturing goods for the tourism industry. The foundation provides marketing and bookkeeping services to these cooperatives for a fee, with the intention of making them fully independent in the long term. Indeed, this project has resulted in enriching the lives of previously unemployed women by equipping them with marketable skills and giving them the opportunity to earn a living. In addition, the foundation builds market stalls for farmers to market their produce. Some farmers have been trained by the company on sustainable agricultural techniques.
Discussion and Implications
Based on the fieldwork evidence presented in this study, it is clear that each of the perspectives offered by the issue life cycle, legitimacy, and stakeholder theories (discussed earlier in this article) is useful in understanding corporate responsiveness to social issues. In this section, I will explore how these theoretical perspectives fit with the empirical results. In each case, the propositions developed will be stated and then the results of the empirical study will be discussed.
The Issue Life Cycle (Proposition 1)
The social responsiveness of a corporation will proceed through a predictable series of phases, from issue identification through a learning phase and to a commitment phase.
When taking a long view, the issue life cycle has some applicability. All the oil and mining companies exhibited an overall trend toward increased commitment to local communities and development initiatives. This is plainly the case with regard to education and social welfare. For example, in Phase 1, Anglo-American described its rationale for the provision of educational and welfare initiatives as follows: "High levels of very poor education attainment, high levels of illiteracy, limited economic opportunities for people, limited health and social networks and care" (M. Keeton, personal communication, August 25, 1999) . In later phases, with the development of greater development commitment, the tone changed dramatically. They have established departments or foundations dedicated to social investment. In some cases, as with Shell Nigeria, an expert on social issues has been employed to implement the company policy.
Moreover, the prediction of a steady increase in investment is borne out in each phase. This study found that a period of increasing commitment is followed by a higher phase of dedication. Phase 1 was marked by a strong, deliberate, and conscious societal strategy. In Phase 2, the societal strategy of this period, in terms of content, was conscious and even active and creative. In Phases 3 and 4, all the companies posit that they have a powerful and deliberate social strategy marked by a public commitment to high levels of social investment. This commitment is reflected in mission statements and credos.
Legitimacy Theory (Proposition 2)
The issues of management activities of a corporation will be driven by the existence of legitimacy gaps. Management will adopt strategies, depending on which strategy has the highest possibility of success and the lowest cost.
The findings presented here demonstrate the existence of a significant legitimacy gap between corporations and host communities. In Nigeria, for example, Shell managers fervently believed that they had pursued a purposeful and principled strategy of economic and social development. Yet, the Ogoni people drove Shell away from their region because of the general perception of gross shortfalls in corporate behavior. In consequence, renewed efforts were made to improve the quality, range, and scale of services provided, thereby recognizing and attempting to bridge the legitimacy gap. Each of the companies involved in this study experienced something similar.
Stakeholder Theory (Proposition 3)
Managers will respond to the demands of the most powerful stakeholders. As stakeholder groups gain and lose power, managerial activities will change focus.
This study found support for stakeholder theory. The companies studied were clearly extremely sensitive to the demands of major stakeholders. Managers who fail to respond to powerful stakeholders risk having groups exercise their power negatively against the corporation. The international campaign against Shell in Nigeria is a case in point. Shell, as a result, rewrote its Statement of General Business Principles to include new statements on the community, human rights, and health, safety, and the environment. In all cases, the issues addressed are associated with influential stakeholder groups that apply pressure through whatever means of influence is at their disposal.
Conclusion, Limitations, and Directions for Future Research
This study has demonstrated that community development initiatives and investments are vital for the establishment of a cordial relationship between MNEs and their host communities in LDCs. One of the issues raised is that of host community expectations. The communities above all want social development projects that provide hope of a stable and prosperous future. The companies, on the other hand, have embraced development initiatives primarily to demonstrate that they are socially responsible. This is done by providing services such as scholarships, classrooms, and teachers for local com-munities. The situation here conforms with the work of Monsen (1974) , who examines the role of multinationals in society and concludes that business has an obligation to help in solving problems of public concern.
The study also examined the rationale for social welfare provision. It was concluded that by providing social welfare initiatives for host communities, MNEs act as a surrogate for governments in LDCs that often ignore the economic and social welfare programs that can contribute to both economic and social development of the communities. The evidence presented in this article supports the theoretical position of Nasi et al. (1997) in that the corporations identified and responded to the exercise of stakeholder power. There was increased organizational commitment to social action, a transition from reflection to concrete action, increased organizational familiarity with social problems and potential solutions, and increased standardization of responses to social issues at the operation level.
Furthermore, the argument in favor of infrastructure and small business development to enhance the business knowledge and skills of local people was won. Host governments had never provided these services in the past. The host communities can benefit and are benefiting from such services. Yet the companies must still convince the communities that their social programs do more than satisfy a public relations agenda and that they are carefully planned to reduce poverty, unemployment, and underdevelopment. The provision of social infrastructure and small business development exemplifies the argument of Lee and Mckenzie (1994) . They argue that corporations have not only economic and legal obligations but also responsibilities to society that extend beyond these. According to this view, legitimacy of the firm depends on maintaining and developing broader social compacts rather than simply addressing immediate problems and issues.
A fundamental question that might be raised from the above concerns the extent to which business can legitimately be asked to respond to the interests, values, and demands of individuals and groups affected by large scale operations. Is it right to blame MNEs for the failure of governments in LDCs? After all, firms exist with the aim of generating profit for their shareholders. They also have to compete fiercely to perform their economic functions. MNEs employ a small but significant proportion of the population in LDCs, and the available evidence proves that they pay better wages than do governments and domestic companies. They are also the principal conduit for technology transfer.
Another question frequently raised is why MNEs are blamed for the underdevelopment in their host communities when they pay taxes and royalties to governments. One of the key findings in this study is that the host communities blamed the companies when drawing the attention of governments to their plights. The host communities know that if they put pressure on the companies by involving the international community, the companies will in turn put pressure on the government to protect their image in developed countries where any unethical report can affect their market position. In many LDCs, things are now changing, and negotiations and agreements increasingly include communities and regional and local governments receiving shares of the revenue. Attempts have also been made, through policy and legislative changes, to redistribute some of the benefits to the local level, as witnessed in Nigeria in 2003.
The long-term benefits to local communities from development initiatives outweigh the capital invested. This is because corporations can forge a trusting community and a safe environment for the conduct of business. Educational initiatives and the provision of social infrastructure provide in the long term a community that is educated and understands that MNEs are business organizations providing goods and services on a global basis. Both companies and host communities gain from the employment of better educated people in communities often plagued with unemployment and unrest.
Increased attention on activities of MNEs has opened up important areas of inquiry in management research and enabled corporations to pay more attention to various stakeholders affected by their day-to-day business decision making. However, available literature has paid little attention to activities of MNEs in LDCs and, in particular, oil and mining companies operating in some of the volatile constituencies in African countries, despite all the headlines these industries have generated in recent times. This article demonstrates how corporate social responsibility and community development projects are relevant to oil and mining companies and the significance of these issues on overall corporate strategy.
To fill the gap in the literature, an empirical study was carried out in Nigeria and South Africa-the giants of African economies. The empirical study in this case provides evidence for both positive and negative actions of MNEs and the pressure on companies by their various stakeholders.
In this article, qualitative research exploits two main sources of data: print (documentary research) and oral (interviews). The construction of cases required the collection and examination of documents addressing issues not covered in other sources of data. The basic data collected from documentary sources-historical and contemporary records generated by oil and mining companies, government departments, unions, and producing communitieshelp in tracing decisions and actions and in pinpointing the social and environmental impacts of oil and mining. Documents often provide data covering long periods and are instructive to a better understanding of the factors impinging on organizational change. Access to documents is more readily available than is access to personal interviews, but because of the nature of this article, virtually nothing has been done in this field in LDCs. On the other hand, there are limitations to the accuracy of print materials: Documents are rarely neutral artifacts; thus, cross-checking is required to determine the representativeness of surviving documents.
Therefore, to provide accurate information to support the documentary research, a case study approach is used to develop different cases for the study area. The case study approach uses interviews and archival research to collect data on various issues raised above during the field study. One advantage is that it gives an in-depth picture of the situation under study. It also gives insight to real-life incidents in oil and mining operations, especially in LDCs.
One of the major limitations of this study is that its design did not allow examination of other MNEs aside from the oil and mining companies. The study of the manufacturing sector and domestic companies might have painted a different picture. Moreover, it is not clear in this article if public relation agenda is one of the reasons MNEs pursue corporate social responsibility issues vigorously in the countries visited. Future research should take the public relations factor into consideration in this type of inquiry.
A possible limitation of this study is that the cases come from extractive industries and their stakeholders and may not be generalizable to other industries. Nonetheless, there is no reason to believe that issues at stake here will be treated differently in other industries. However, other industries may provide fewer community development projects because they may have fewer environmental and social issues compared to oil and mining companies.
To have a complete picture of the issues discussed in this article, future research should focus on other LDCs and other industries, in particular the pharmaceutical industry. This industry has generated many ethical debates because of the way they operate in LDCs. Such studies would help to identify different corporate social responsibility approaches MNEs apply to provide community development projects in LDCs.
Notes
3. World Business Council for Sustainable Development is a coalition of more than 120 international companies united by a shared commitment to the environment and to the principles of sustainable development.
4. Social issues are social problems that may exist objectively but become issues requiring managerial attention when they are defined as being problematic to society or an institution within society by a group of actors or stakeholders capable of influencing either government action or company policies. (Nasi, Nasi, Phillips, & Zyglidopoulos, 1997, p. 297) 5. Phase 1: Policy. During this phase, a given social or environmental issue first emerges as a top management concern. Usually, the chief executive officer (CEO) identifies the issue as one that deserves his or her personal attention, states the organization's concern with the issue, and formulates a general policy to deal with the issue. Phase 2: Learning. This phase is characterized by the addition to the corporate staff of a specialist who is given the responsibility of implementing the company's social policy. Phase 3: Commitment. During this phase, organizational responsiveness is integrated into ongoing business decisions and becomes the responsibility of line managers. However, the transition from Phase 2 to Phase 3 is often traumatic and is the result of an externally or internally induced crisis.
6. This information was received from the interviews carried out with P. Omuku and N. Pepple of Shell Nigeria and also from Shell Nigeria's annual reports of 1996, 1997, and 1998. 7. Other information was collected from interviews with P. Omuku and N. Pepple of Shell Nigeria. The company's annual reports of 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 were also consulted for the data used.
8. Shell's annual reports of 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998. 9 . Information was received from an interview with M. Keeton and from the Anglo-American's annual reports of 1996, 1997, and 1998. 10. Information from De Beers's 1996, 1997, and 1998 annual reports. 11. There have been some studies criticizing the governments of developing countries for not developing their mineral and oil communities (e.g., Khan, 1994 , "Shell Nigeria staff," 1997 .
12. Information was collected from interviews with P. Omuku and N. Pepple of Shell Nigeria and the company's annual reports . 13. Information from Palabora Mining Company 1996 
